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Comments
MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION AS A REQUIRE-
MENT FOR RESCISSION OF INSURANCE
CONTRACTS
Insurance is extensively used in modern society as a means of
providing security against losses, damages and liability upon the
happening of chance events.' Nearly every legally capable person
in the United States holds or has held an insurance policy of one
type or another. Generally, the risk insured against is assessed,
the premiums calculated, and the policy granted in reliance on
statements made by the applicant in response to insurer's inquiries
at the time of application.2 While there are several defenses which
an insurer may advance denying liability on a policy,3 one of the
commonest is based upon insured's false statements to the insurer
during application. This defense is untenable in Pennsylvania un-
less the statements are: (1) false; (2) material; 4 and (3) fraudu-
lent.5 The purpose of this Comment is to examine Pennsylvania's
1. Insurance is a contract by which one party, in consideration of
a price paid adequate to the risk, becomes security to the other that
he may not suffer loss, prejudice or damage by the happening of
the perils specified to certain things which may be exposed to
them.
Physicians Defense Co. v. Cooper, 199 F. 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1912). See, e.g.,
CALIF. INS. CODE ANNOT. § 22 (1955) (as codified).
2. There are limited situations where an insurance policy may be
issued upon the statements of one other than the insured. See, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40 § 532.6(3), (4) (1954) (recognizing employer and insurer as
contracting parties under an employer group insurance plan).
3. See, e.g., Keystone Mut. Benefit Ass'n v. Norris, 115 Pa. 446, 8
A. 638 (1887) (lack of insurable interest); Browne v. John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 119 Pa. Super. 222 (1935) (nonpayment of premiums).
4. For present purposes consider "material" to mean those facts of
substantial impact within the law to warrant relief from contractual
obligation for falsity.
5. Schleifer v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 421 Pa. 359, 219 A.2d 692
(1966). Reliance is occasionally cited as a separate requirement. See,
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judicial and legislative requirements with respect to the second
requirement-material misrepresentations. The historical develop-
ment and present relevance of the inquiry will be discussed and
recommendations made for clarification of issues involved.
GENERAL BACKGROUND
Certain basic concepts and distinctions must be considered pre-
liminarily for a better understanding of the area to be discussed.
When applying for an insurance policy it is customary to answer
questions propounded by the insurer. This is done by writing the
answers on a printed application, or responding verbally and hav-
ing the insurer's agent fill in the application, which is thereafter
signed by the applicant. The information is normally sought to
aid the insurer in deciding whether to accept the risk, and if ac-
cepted to establish an appropriate premium payment relative to
the risk to be assumed.0 Since the application or policy is an
offer 7 which becomes a binding contract upon acceptance,8 ordinary
contract principles apply 9 as a general rule. These regulations
e.g., Adriaenssens v. Allstate Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1958) (applying
Oklahoma Law). A proper definition of materiality includes the require-
ment of reliance of fact and makes separate listing thereof unnecessary as
will be discussed. This is recognized in the rule that an insurer is pre-
sumed to have acted in reliance on the truth of a material representation.
Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 93 F.2d 740, 742 (10th Cir. 1937);
7 COUCH on INSURANCE § 35:95 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as CoucH].
6. Linnastruth v. Mut. Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 22 Cal. 2d
216, 137 P.2d 833 (1943); Minich v. M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co., 325 S.W.2d 56
(Mo. Ct. App. 1959). Note, however courts recognize that questions may
be asked merely out of curiosity or to gather statistics and if so have no
bearing upon the risk assumed by the insurer and therefore "materiality."
Keys v. Pace, 358 Mich. 74, 80, 99 N.W.2d 547, 551 (1959) (wherein ques-
tions as to license revocations held asked for purposes of risk appraisal).
Likewise questions as to name and address are needed for purposes other
than selection of risk. PATTERSON, INSURANCE § 78 (2d ed. 1957) [herein-
after cited as PATTERSON].
7. Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Pratt, 130 Cal. App. 2d 151, 278 P.2d 489
(1955); Ludwinska v. Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 317 Pa. 577, 178 A. 28
(1935); Munkall v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 300 Pa. 327, 150 A. 645 (1930). Where
the applicant has not paid until the policy is delivered, however, or where
a different policy from that agreed to is tendered, the policy tender itself
represents the offer. PATTERSON, supra note 6, at § 14.
8. Acc. Ins. Dept. of Order of Railway Conductors of America v.
Brooks, 216 Ala. 605, 114 So. 6 (1927); K.C. Working Chemical Co. v.
Eureka-Security Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 82 Cal. App. 2d 120, 185 P.2d 832
(1947); Munkall v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 300 Pa. 327, 150 A. 645 (1930)
(holding execution of policy by insurer uncommunicated to insured is not
an acceptance).
9. Gillam v. Equitable Life Assur. Co., 143 Neb. 647, 10 N.W.2d 693
(1943); Tsosie v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 77 N.M. 671, 427 P.2d 29
(1967); McCaffrey v. Knights and Ladies of Columbia, 213 Pa. 609, 63 A. 189
require the utmost good faith-uberrima fides-since the insurer
ordinarily must rely on the applicant for his knowledge of the
facts. 0
The statements of the applicant may be classified as either
representations" or warranties 2 with the distinction between them
being inconsistently drawn. 3 At common law the falsity of a
warranted fact' 4 was ground for rescission' 5 of an insurance con-
(1906); Ivory v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 78 S.D. 296, 101 N.W.2d 517 (1960). It
must be remembered, however, that the insurance contract being aleatory
and adhesionary in nature necessitates the application of special contract
rules. Likewise, the salient policy considerations involved when dealing
with insurance contracts very often results in a flexible application of con-
tract rules. For example the general contract presumption that parties to
a contract are familiar with and accept its terms is not rigidly applied to
insurance contracts. Glickman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 16 Cal. 2d
581, 107 P.2d 252 (1940); VANCE, INSURANCE § 44 (3d ed. 1951) [hereinafter
cited as VANCE]. The novel legal sanction of incontestible clauses in life
insurance contracts results from recognized socio-economic policies. V. B.
MACLEAN, LIFE INSURANCE 485-86 (8th ed. 1957). On the aleatory nature
of insurance contracts see PATTERSON § 11 (2d ed. 1957).
10. Allstate v. Orloff, 106 F. Supp. 114 (Mich. 1952); Smith v. Columbia
Ins. Co., 17 Pa. 253 (1851); CLARK ON CONTRACTS 288 (4th ed. 1931)
[hereinafter cited as CLARK]; 1 A. J. GOLDIN, THE LAW OF INSURANCE IN
PENNSYLVANIA § 217 (2d ed. 1946) (and cases cited in footnote thereto)
[hereinafter cited as GOLDIN].
11. A representation is a written or oral statement of fact made by
the applicant to induce the insurer to contract, being collateral to the
contract once formed. It need be only substantially true. See, e.g., PAT-
TERSON, § 75 (2d ed. 1957); VANCE § 67 (3d ed. 1951); N.Y. INS. LAW § 149
(1) (1939) (as codified).
12. A warranty is a written or oral fact which constitutes a part of
the contract between the parties and which must be strictly true under
penalty of breach, it being a condition of the insurer's promise. See, e.g.,
45 C.J.S. Insurance § 473(4) (1946); PATTERSON §§ 60-61 (2d ed. 1957).
13. A discussion of judicial determinations of warranties is beyond
the scope of this paper. See, Kimball, Warranties, Representations and
Concealments in Utah Insurance Law, 4 UTAH L. REV. 456 (1954-1955);
Magarick, The Application and Declarations in the Standard Automobile
Insurance Policy, 66 DICK. L. REV. 403 (1961-1962).
14. In dealing with warranties or representations the misstatement to
be "false" must be of a fact within the knowledge of declarant.
Representations as to future conduct or events or as to other things
not susceptible of present, actual, knowledge, amounts only to
statements of intention, opinion or belief. As to such representa-
tions the good faith of the insured furnishes the criterion of trust
for they can be false only when the intention, opinion, or belief as
stated is not honestly entertained.
VANCE, § 68 at 394 (3d ed. 1951). Pennsylvania has found it more con-
venient to call the fact false, but require that the declarant was capable of
knowing of the falsity before being actionable. Evans v. Penn Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 287 Pa. 128, 134 A. 474 (1936); Haag v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
348 Pa. 614, 36 A.2d 470 (1944); Livingood v. New York Life Ins. Co., 287
Pa. 128, 134 A. 474 (1926). The result is the same, except the Pennsylvania
courts categorize the requirement as "fraud." That such terminology is
unnecessary and leads to confusion will be discussed infra.
15. To declare a contract void in its inception . . . not merely to
terminate it and release parties from further obligation to each
other, but to abrogate it from the beginning and restore parties to
the relative position's which they would have occupied had no con-
tracts ever been made.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1471 (4th ed. 1951). Upon discovering a misrepre-
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tract without regard to "materiality." 6 The apparently conclusive
quality of false warranties without regard to materiality has been
mitigated by case law 17 and statutory directive.18 As a result, the
present impact of warranted facts in dispensing with proof of
materiality is negligible.
RELEVANCY OF MATERIALITY
Pennsylvania common law required that a misrepresentation
or concealment 19 be material to avoid a contract of insurance.
20
An 1885 statute21 applying to life insurance incorporated the com-
mon law requirement of materiality as to representations and ex-
tended the requirement to warranties. The statute read:
Whenever the application for a policy of life insurance con-
tains a warranty of the truth of the answers therein con-
sentation which is of alleged legal significance the previously voidable
contract becomes voided by the insurer's notifying the insured of the
rescission and tendering back of premiums paid. If the rescission is chal-
lenged, judicial determination is secured by defending an action brought
by the insured or his beneficiary. See PATTERSON § 75 (2d ed. 1957).
16. Keys v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 134 Pa. Super. 514, 4 A.2d
529 (1939); Fitzgerald v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 90 Vt. 291, 98 A. 498
(1916). Otherwise stated that all warranties are conclusively presumed to
be material. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mechanics' Savings Bank & Trust
Co., 12 F. 413 (6th Cir. 1896) (applying Pennsylvania law). VANCE § 73
(3d ed. 1951).
17. Pennsylvania courts have required that falsely warranted facts be
"material" or otherwise the cause of actual prejudice to insurer whenever
necessary to effectuate a desired result. See, e.g., Hartman v. Keystone
Ins. Co., 21 Pa. 463 (1853) (wherein the court felt constrained to discuss
materiality notwithstanding the fact which was given was apparently war-
ranted); Watertown Fire Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 96 Pa. 520 (1880) (wherein
warranted facts qualified by express requirement of materiality).
18. Pennsylvania insurance law requires that all statements made by
the applicant in applying for insurance be deemed representations and not
warranties. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 512a (life, endowment, accident or
health) 532.6 (group life) (1954), Such a statute necessitates proof of ma-
teriality since only material misrepresentations can avoid a contract of
insurance as will be discussed infra. The Pennsylvania provision is
common. See, e.g., K. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.656 (1963); N.M. STAr. ANN.
§ 58-8-1(4) (1953) (life insurance); N.Y. INS. LAW § 142(3) (1939) (general
provision); TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.44(4) (1963) (life insurance).
19. A concealment will not avoid a policy of insurance unless amount-
ing to an intentional withholding of a material fact. 1 GOLDIN § 279 (2d
ed. 1946). Only if the insured knew or should have reasonably known of
the materiality of the fact can a nondisclosure thereof be considered in-
tentional. Thus fraud becomes a relevant inquiry when considering con-
cealments in the United States. See, VANCE, § 61 (3d ed. 1951).
20. Hartman v. Keystone Ins. Co., 21 Pa. 466 (1853); Smith v. Colum-
bia Ins. Co., 17 Pa. 253 (1851); Satterthwaite v. Mutual Benefit Ins. Assoc.,
14 Pa. 393 (1850).
21. Act of 1885 (June 23) P.L. 134 (repealed).
tained, no misrepresentation or untrue statements in such
application, made in good faith by the applicant shall
effect a forfeiture or be a ground of defense in any suit
brought upon any policy of insured issued upon the faith
of such application unless such misrepresentation or untrue
statement relate to some matter material to the risk.
2 2
Thus began the statutory requirement of materiality in Pennsyl-
vania. Presently, Pennsylvania's statutory insurance law is pro-
fuse.2 38 Materiality in varying phraseology is expressly or impliedly
required in endowment, annuity, accident-health, 24 group 25 and
fire26 insurance. The present statutory provisions directly require
either a "material fact ' 27 or a false statement which "materially
affected either the acceptance of the risk or the hazard assumed
by the insurer. '28 Other statutory provisions require proof of
materiality by necessary implication via a statutory clause reading
"all statements made by the insured [in applying for insurance]
... shall be deemed ... representations and not warranties.
'29
Since a representation must be material to avoid a policy as pre-
viously discussed, 0 the statute necessitates proof thereon. There-
fore, materiality of a misstatement in applying for insurance is a
necessary prerequisite to rescission of an insurance contract.8 '
IMPACT OF THE REQUIREMENT OF FRAUD
Before considering what is necessary to establish materiality
under Pennsylvania law, it is necessary to discuss what has become
a growing preoccupation of the courts with the emphasis of "fraud"
as the controlling inquiry in insurance litigation involving mis-
representations. There exists conflict over what is the true basis
for rescission for misrepresentation. As a result confusion exists
over the proper criteria thereon. Many prominent insurance law
writers state that presently the true basis is a breach of an implied
condition that all representations on the faith of which the contract
22. Id. "The purpose of the statute was to destroy any conventional
materiality and to open to judicial investigation the question on its merits."
Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mechanics' Savings Bank & Trust Co., 72 F.
413, 431 (6th Cir. 1896). Thus ended the ipso facto avoidance of life in-
surance policies merely by proving the falsity of a warranted fact.
23. See, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 (1954). The bulk of the statutory ma-
terials concern administrative requirements.
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 512, 757 (1954).
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 532.6 (1954).
26. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 657 (1954).
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 657 (1954) (standard fire insurance pol-
icy).
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 757 (1954) (life insurance).
29. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 512 (annuity, life, endowment, acci-
dent and health insurance), 532.6 (group insurance) (1954). See note 18,
supra.
30. See p. 52 supra.
31. Even where materiality is not required by statutory language, the
common law requirement continues. See, Carstairs v. American Bonding
& Trust Co., 112 F. 620 (E.D. Pa. 1902), aff'd, 116 F. 449 (3d Cir. 1902).
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was entered into were substantially true 2 They would find that
the crucial issue in determining materiality is whether the insurer
has been misled, not whether the insured intended to mislead the
insurer.
Pennsylvania does not follow this view. It declaratively joined
those states83 requiring fraud or intent to mislead in the leading
case of Evans v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co.84 by stating that the
"insurer must establish, in order to avoid the policy in the case of
representations, that the statements relied on were falsely and
fraudulently made." 8 It is beyond the scope of this paper to con-
sider this decision and its substantial ramifications in detail nor is
it beneficial since there exists sufficient materials thereon. 6 As
32. 12 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 7294 (1943); PATTER-
SON § 76 (2d ed. 1957); VANCE § 67 (3d ed. 1951). While it is recognized
that English courts originally allowed rescission only for fraudulent mis-
representations, during the nineteenth century rescission became available
for innocent material representations. The later rule became well estab-
lished in early marine insurance and only recently has there been a return
to the requirement of fraud.
33. It is difficult to determine categorically the number of states re-
quiring fraudulent intent due to the constant conflict of judicial opinion
even within a given state. It is clear, nonetheless, that an ever increasing
number of states are requiring fraudulent intent in varying degrees. See,
e.g., Accident Ins. Dept. of Order of Railway Conductors of America v.
Brooks, 216 Ala. 605, 114 So. 6 (1927); Standard Ins. Co. v. Pratt, 130 Cal.
App. 151, 278 P.2d 1949 (1955); Amoskeag Trust Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
88 N.M. 154, 185 A. 2 (1936); General American Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez,
149 S.W.2d 637 (Civ. App. Tex. 1941); Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York
v. Middlemiss, 103 Utah 429, 135 P.2d 275 (1943).
34. 322 Pa. 547, 186 A. 133 (1936). This case held that the good faith
of insured was properly left to jury when insured represented that he was
in good health when in fact insured had been treated over an extended
period for dislocation of a vertebrae near the base of the brain. While most
often cited as the prime authority for the requirement of fraud, earlier
cases had so required although perhaps not as definitively. See, e.g.,
Suravitz v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 244 Pa. 582, 91 A. 495 (1914)
(requiring bad faith of applicant to void policy where false representa-
tions as to a latent disease involved); Kuhns v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
297 Pa. 418, 147 A. 76 (1929) (requiring intent to conceal the truth where
proof that medical examiner inserted false answers on application after
being told the truth).
35. Evans v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 322 Pa. 547, 553, 186 A. 133,
138 (1936). Materiality according to the Evans court is no longer the only
inquiry but remains relevant in determining whether the false answer was
made with an intent to deceive. Id. at 554, 186 A. at 138. While the inti-
mation thus becomes that materiality is dependent on insured's concept of
what is important to the insurer, subsequent cases have not so held.
36. For a thorough analysis of the case and tracing of the historical
inquiries involving misrepresentations in insurance litigation see, Magaw,
Representations in the Law of Life Insurance, 11 TEMP. L.Q. 463 (1937) and
12 TEMP. L.Q. 55 (1937) (where advocating abolition of fraud requirement).
The case is likewise criticized in a recent case note appearing in 11 TEMP.
will be shown, however, when the requirement for fraud is con-
sidered in its proper perspective, the importance of establishing
materiality continues.
The "legal fraud" necessary for rescission, unlike the "actual
fraud" in an action for damages, is generally presumed where there
has been a false presentation of a fact within the knowledge of the
declarent.3 7  It is submitted that this emphasis on requiring that
the fact misrepresented was capable of knowledge by the insured
is a misplaced reiteration of the common law abhorrence of rescis-
sion where misstatements of opinion, belief or intent were in-
volved. 8 Therefore, materiality should be as equally important
after the Evans decision as before.
Further, there has never been a case reported where a fraudu-
lent but immaterial representation was held sufficient to justify
a rescission. 9 Despite the fact that courts often state a fraudulent
misrepresentation need not be of a material fact to justify rescis-
sion,40 in reality there is an inherent understanding that unless the
fact was material, the insurer has not been misled and the fraud is
harmless.41 There can be no rescission unless materiality be es-
tablished. The requirement of fraud has not removed or modified
L.Q. 267 (1937). For an article supporting the requirement of fraud as
established by Evans see Hutton, Comment on Evans v. Penn Mutual Life
Insurance Company of Philadelphia, 42 DICK. L. REV. 178 (1938).
37. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Saftlas, 38 F. Supp. 708 (E.D.
Pa. 1941) (knowledge of insured determined by inferences); Friedman
v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 342 Pa. 404, 21 A.2d 81 (1941) (wherein overruling
of jury verdict for insured sustained where insured misrepresented that he
had not had previous medical consultations of any nature when in fact he
had had many). Indovena v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 334 Pa. 167, 5 A.2d
556 (1939); Evans v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 322 Pa. 547, 186 A. 133
(1936). See also Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moriarity, 187 F.2d 470 (9th Cir.
1949).
38. See note 14 supra. That more than mere falsity and materiality
need be shown to rescind for misrepresentations of opinion, belief or prom-
issory intent seems dictated by the socio-economic policy considerations.
Under such circumstance the insurer is just as assuredly misled in esti-
mating the risk involved, yet the insured is clearly less culpable where he
has answered to the best of his present ability but subsequent circumstances
make his answers false in fact. This has always been recognized. While it
may be thoroughly proper to require fraud in such cases, to then require
fraud for all misrepresentations as a prerequisite to rescission, it is sub-
mitted is neither historically, logically nor equitably sound.
39. PATTERSON § 84 (2d ed. 1957); VANCE § 67 at 388 (3d ed. 1951).
40. See, e.g., Kentucky Central Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Lynn,
304 Ky. 416, 200 S.W.2d 946 (1947); Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mechanics'
Savings Bank & Trust Co., 72 F. 413 (6th Cir. 1896) (applying Pennsylvania
law); Fitzgerald v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 90 Vt. 291, 301, 98 A. 498, 503
(1916).
41. See, Hadley v. Providence Savings Bank Life Assurance Society,
90 F. 390 (D.C. Mass. 1898) (stating that an immaterial fraudulent mis-
representation must have at least been relied upon by the insurer before
voiding a contract). As one writer has noted, "The purpose in allowing
rescission is to protect the insurer and its other policy holders against un-
desirable risks, not to punish the dishonest applicant whose dishonesty has
caused no harm." PATTERSON § 84 at 434 (2d ed. 1957).
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this principle although admittedly the emphasis on the materiality
inquiry is concurrently reduced.
42
THE DETERMINATION OF MATERIALITY IN PENNSYLVANIA
Very early, Pennsylvania courts were struggling with the
quaere as to what constituted a material misrepresentation. In the
Pennsylvania common law case of Hartman v. Keystone Ins. Co.45
an insured had stated at the time of application that his occu-
pation was a farmer. In fact, there was sufficient proof he was a
slave catcher. The insurer defended claims made after the death
of the insured by pleading inter alia the false statement. It is not
clear whether the court considered the statement a representation
or warranty.44 Nonetheless, in requiring materiality it was stated:
"Every fact is material which increases the risk, or which if dis-
closed, would have been a fair reason for demanding a higher
premium." 45 Further, upon a claim that the misrepresentation had
to increase the risk and induce the insurer to demand a higher
premium, ". . . a policy like the present one will be vitiated by
the misrepresentation of any fact which would increase the risk
merely . . . anything which increases the risk cannot be imma-
terial."4 6
42. Recent Pennsylvania cases reveal cursory mention of material-
ity, the major discussion being on fraud. See, e.g., Lynch v. Metropolitan
Ins. Co., 427 Pa. 418, 235 A.2d 406 (1967) (representations as to medical his-
tory held evidently material to risk); Orr v. Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co.,
202 Pa. Super. 553, 198 A.2d 431 (1964) (misrepresentations as to previous
illnesses summarily held material citing other cases); Magee v. National
Life and Accident Ins. Co., 201 Pa. Super. 140, 192 A.2d 752 (1963) (rep-
resentations as to prior medical attendance summarily held material citing
other cases). That the courts infrequently still feel constrained to discuss
materiality see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stinger, 400 Pa. 533, 163 A.2d 74 (1960)
(wherein misrepresentation as to license revocation held in dictum not to be
material after finding of no bad faith).
43. 21 Pa. 466 (1853). This is one of the earliest Pennsylvania cases
dealing with materiality of false statements. For earlier cases discussing
materiality of concealments and duty to disclose material facts, espousing
similar principles as declared in Hartman see, Lefavour v. Ins. Co., 1 Phila.
558 (1852); Smith v. Columbia Ins. Co., 17 Pa. 243 (1851); Satterthwaite v.
Mut. Benefit Ins. Ass'n, 14 Pa. 393 (1850).
44. The policy provided that it would be voided if the declarations of
the insured were in "any respect untrue," creating formally "a warranty by
the express terms of the policy." On the same page the court refers to the
statement as a representation. Since it is further stated that the above
quoted language will not void a policy unless such inaccurate statements
are material, it becomes clear that the distinction is irrelevant as far as the
requirement of materiality is concerned. Hartman v. Keystone Ins. Co., 21
Pa. 466, 477 (1853).
45. Id. at 477.
46. Id. at 477.
Materiality is a legal standard to aid in determining justice
as between the insurer and insured whenever misrepresentations
are involved.41 It finds its origin in judicial regard for the con-
tractual relationship between the parties. Encompassed within the
concept of materiality is the degree of legal importance a fact
must have before a falsification thereof will sustain an attempted
rescission of an insurance contract based on falsification. Hart-
man declared the standard for regarding the misrepresented fact
"material" as one which would: (1) increase the risk; or (2) cause
the insurer to demand a higher premium or reject the risk alto-
gether had the truth been known.48 These are two distinct tests.
The first is objective: whether the fact misrepresented increased
the risk. This requirement was satisfied in Hartman since the risk
of an earlier death is manifestly increased where the insured is a
slave catcher as opposed to a farmer.49 The second test is more
subjective. It looks to the insurer involved and whether the in-
surer has been substantially misled. Substantiality is not estab-
lished unless the insurer would have rejected the particular risk
or accepted the same only at a higher premium had the truth been
known. This requirement was likewise met in Hartman since the
insurer established by uncontradicted evidence that the company's
general practice was not to insure slave catchers at all.50
As a general rule a fact increasing the risk will correspond-
ingly increase the premium for an acceptable risk since premium
determinations are calculated acording to the risk involved.51
Since, however, an insurer infrequently may not charge higher
premiums regardless of whether there is a technical increase of risk
by the existence of some fact, the distinctions between the tests
becomes relevant, and the weaknesses of the "risk" criteria appar-
ent.5 12 For this reason, the "increase of risk" criteria has yielded
47. PATTERSON § 82 at 410 (2d ed. 1957).
48. If the insurer would have rejected the risk all together it must
also be material since such action necessarily evinces even stronger in-
surer inducement than a mere increase in premiums. See, e.g., Hartman v.
Keystone Ins. Co., 21 Pa. 466, 478 (1853).
49. And so the clerk of the insurer testified. Id. at 478.
The term risk means the uncertainty of the occurrence of an
event (a contingent event) that, if it does occur, will cause harm to
some interest of some person or persons. The degree or extent of
the chance of its occurrence is called the probability of the occur-
rence of the event.
PATTERSON § 53 at 226 (2d ed. 1957). The probability may be an arithmetical
expression computed from statistics or an estimate based on comparable
experiences. Id. at 226-28.
50. Hartman v. Keystone Ins. Co., 21 Pa. 466, 478 (1853). That such
evidence is inadmissible to establish materiality in some jurisdictions will
be discussed infra.
51. That representations are the principle inducements to contracts
and provide the best grounds for premium calculation was early recognized
in Clark v. Manufacturer's Ins. Co., 17 U.S. (8 How.) 569 (1849).
52. An insurer may not regard the increase in risk as substantial
enough to require an increase in premium. For example, in the case of
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to the more logical "influence over insurer" criteria in Pennsyl-
vania, risk increase being interpreted in a technical rather than
physical sense, as will be more fully discussed later.
The Pennsylvania Insurance Act of 1885 incorporated the lan-
guage "material to the risk"5 into the statute. In considering this
language the sixth circuit court of appeals in Penn Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Mechanics' Savings Bank & Trust Co.54 stated:
A fact is material to an insurance risk when it naturally
and substantially increases the probability of that event
upon which the policy is to become payable. Materiality of
a fact in insurance law is subjective. It concerns the
impression which the facts claimed to be material would
reasonably and naturally convey to the insurer's mind be-
fore the event and at the time the insurance is effected
[A] fair test of the materiality of a fact is found, there-
fore, in the answer to the question whether reasonably
careful and intelligent men would have regarded the fact,
communicated at the time of affecting the insurance, as
substantially increasing the chances of the loss insured
against. The best evidence of this is to be found in the
usage and practice of insurance companies in regard to
raising the rates or rejecting the risk on becoming aware
of the fact.55
Penn Mutual acepted the Hartman standards of actual in-
crease of risk and subjective inducements to the insurer as neces-
sary elements of materiality, but without using the alternative
language of Hartman. The test of materiality adopted looks to
whether a reasonable man or reasonable insurance company would
have regarded the risk as increased. The importance of the case
is in its recognition of the subjective nature of the materiality in-
quiry since the contractual basis of an action for rescission based
on misrepresentation was acknowledged. To frame the test in
terms of whether reasonable insurers would consider the risk in-
creased is incongruous and so later cases appear to recognize.5 0
McCaffrey v. Knights and Ladies of Columbia, 213 Pa. 609, 63 A. 189 (1906),
a misrepresentation as to state of pregnancy at the time of application for
group insurance was held not material since according to the by-laws of the
insurer it appeared that neither the applicant would have been rejected
nor a higher premium charged had the truth been known. Yet it is unde-
niable that pregnancy would increase the risk of an earlier death during
childbirth. To allow rescission simply because there was a physical in-
crease in risk would controvert the purpose of the materiality inquiry-to
afford relief to an unreasonably misled party in contracting.
53. See p. 254 supra.
54. 72 F. 254 (6th Cir. 1896) (applying Pennsylvania law).
55. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mechanics' Savings Bank & Trust Co.,
72 F. 413, 428-29 (6th Cir. 1896).
56. The Penn Mutual use of materiality has never been cited by a
In 1906, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court partially resolved the
incongruity in McCafferty v. Knights and Ladies of Columbia.57 The
insured in applying for a certificate of insurance with a bene-
ficial company5 s misrepresented that she was not pregnant. The
court found the misrepresentation had to be material within the
Act of 185559 stating "a fact is material to the risk, when, if known
to the underwriter0 it would have caused him to refuse the risk,
or would have been a reason for his demanding a higher premium." 61
The test of materiality as stated in McCafferty is pres-
ently controlling in Pennsylvania. 2 The standard is subjective:
whether the fact if truthfully stated would have led the insurer
to contract on better terms or not at all. While the adjunctive
language "to the risk" appearingly makes reference to the objective
determination of physical risk increase, it has become increasingly
clear that what is truly meant is that the insurer's evaluation of the
risk was substantially impaired.6 3
It is submitted that the Pennsylvania standard of materiality
is in keeping with the contractual basis of the insurance agreement
and works justice for all parties involved. Generally, a finding of
material misrepresentation in contract law requires that the fact
misrepresented was one which induced the formation of the con-
tract. Had the truth been known, the party attacking the mis-
representation would not have entered into the contract on its
present terms.6 4 Assuming that this general contract principle is
Pennsylvania appellate court. The test most closely approximates the"prudent insurer" type test which is discussed and discounted infra at pp.
261-64.
57. 213 Pa. 609, 63 A. 189 (1906).
58. Beneficial societies are non-profit organizations designed to pro-
vide weekly payments for sickness and incapacity as well as death bene-
fits. 2 GOLDIN § 1009 (2d ed. 1946). As such they came within the general
classification of "life insurance" covered by the Act of 1885.
59. McCafferty v. Knights and Ladies of Columbia, 213 Pa. 609, 63 A.
189 (1906). The court carefully examined the rules and regulations of the
company to find the intent of the insurer. It was clear that the court in
determining materiality was not concerned with any objective physical in-
crease of risk nor the influence upon a reasonable insurer. The subjective
inducement to this insurer was the polestar and the companies regula-
tions thereon was competent evidence. Courts have commonly looked at
by-laws, etc. of such companies in determining materiality. See, e.g.,
Satterthwaite v. Mut. Benefit Ins. Ass'n, 14 Pa. (2 Harris.) 393 (1850).
60. "the person who insures another . . . the insurer." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1697 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
61. McCafferty v. Knights and Ladies of Columbia, 213 Pa. 609, 612, 63
A. 189 (1906) (emphasis added) (citing Hartman as authority).
62. See, e.g., Verbich v. Greek Catholic Union of Russian Brotherhoods
of United States, 137 Pa. Super. 64, 8 A.2d 452 (1939).
63. See, Murphy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 205 Pa. 444, 454, 55 A. 19, 23
(1903) (where "risk to company" was increased by misrepresentation as to
health); Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Gruver, 100 Pa. 266, 274 (1882) (equating
increase in "technical risk" with increase in the rate of insurance). This
point is discussed more fully in considering "increase in risk" type stand-
ards in other jurisdictions. See pp. 265-66 infra.
64. See, e.g., Zinn v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 141 P.2d 948, 958 (Cal. App.
1943) (action to rescind sale of corporate stock for fraudulent, material
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applicable to the insurance contract,6 the test of materiality, that
is, of whether the insurer would have rejected the risk or charged
a higher premium, complies with the requirement that the fact
be basic to the contract. The insurer has been misled where he
had not consciously assumed the risk due to the insured's misstate-
ments. If the other requirements for rescission are met-falsity,
fraud and reliance-then the material misstatement will avoid the
policy where the insurer has mistakenly but non-negligently
assumed a risk other than that contracted for.6 Therefore, under
the Pennsylvania standard, the insurer is protected from un-
assumed risks and the insured from mere claims of physical in-
crease of risk.
OTHER TESTS OF MATERIALITY-"PRUDENT INSURER CRITERIA"
Having considered the fundamental concept of material mis-
representation in Pennsylvania, the tests used by other states are
next to be considered. From such a consideration the relative
soundness of the Pennsylvania rule can be best understood. The
misrepresentations); Columbia-Knickerbocker Trust Co. v. Cabot, 247 F.
833, 857 (2d Cir. 1918) (action to rescind a subscription to purchase stock
for fraudulent, material misrepresentation); Schoen v. Lange, 256 S.W.2d
277, 281 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953) (action to rescind agreement of beneficiaries
under a will for fraudulent representations, actionable fraud requiring
materiality in Missouri); De Joseph v. Zambelli, 392 Pa. 24, 139 A.2d 644,
647-48 (1958) (equity action to rescind sale of property for fraudulent
and material misrepresentation, both being present although either would
suffice to make contract voidable).
65. See note 9 infra.
66. Factors affecting the judicial determination of one's mistaken in-
ducement at the time of contracting include: (1) what was the fact (2) was
the fact substantially important-material (3) did either party have
knowledge of the mistake of the other (4) was the mistake the cause of any
party either innocently or fraudulently (5) was the mistaken party negli-
gent (6) how soon was the mistake discovered and notice given (7) has any
person changed his position so that restoration of his former status is im-
possible? CORBIN ON CONTRACTs at 541 (One vol. ed. 1952). While the ma-
teriality of the fact is necessary to support a claim of rescission, the above
considerations likewise may crucially direct a decision for one party over
the other. Negligence on the part of the insurer in assessing the risk may
preclude rescission. Where, for instance, the insurer's agent is negligent in
recording answers of the insured, the assumption of the mistakenly as-
sessed risk being the fault of the insurer is without remedy once the risk
has attached. See Tsosie v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 77 N.M. 671, 427
P.2d 29 (1967). It is otherwise expressed that under such conditions the
insurer is estopped from rescinding. Columbian National Life Ins. Co. v.
Rodgers, 116 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1940); VANCE § 67 at 391 (3d ed. 1951).
In determining whether an insurer's has acted negligently, the reasonable-
ness of the insurer's actions is necessarily in issue. Therefore, in the re-
stricted circumstance where the insurer's negligence is advanced as a de-
fense to a claim of rescission, the general standards of the insurance in-
majority test67 in determining whether a fact misrepresented is
material is whether reasonably careful and intelligent under-
writers would have regarded the fact communicated at the time of
application as substantially increasing the chances of loss insured
against so as to bring about a rejection of the risk or the charging
of an increased premium. This "prudent insurer"68 standard of
materiality appears more objective than the "individual insurer"6 9
standard employed by Pennsylvania and a substantial minority
of states.7" The polestar under the prudent insurer inquiry is the
influence upon the reasonable insurer as defined by the standards
of the insurance industry generally. But even those courts adopting
this standard recognize that the true issue is whether the insurer
involved has been unreasonably misled.71 The test is not framed
in terms of the individual insurer, however, because such subjectiv-
ity allegedly would prejudice the insured's case.
In King v. Ohio Valley Fire & Marine Ins. Co.7 2 an insured,
in applying for fire insurance, misrepresented that the insured
building was a dwelling house when in fact it was used as a brothel.
The lower court's failure to sustain an objection to insurer's evi-
dence that had the company known the truth the policy would
not have been issued was held error. In reaffirming that the
test was to be in terms of a prudent insurer the court held:
Where there has been a concealment or misrepresentation
of a fact in an insurance contract, . . . the temptation for
the individual insurance company or individual agent to
say that, if the truth had been known, the policy would
not have been issued, is so great that the courts require
this matter to be reached in a different way. .... 73
dustry would logically be admissible as relevant thereto. However, it must
be emphasized that such general standards have no relevancy to the issue
of determining materiality under the individual insurer criteria.
67. 29 AM. JuR. Insurance § 701 (1940) (See note 17 and cases there-
under); 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 477 (1946) (see note 42 and cases thereunder);
CoucH § 35:81 (2d ed. 1961); PATTERSON § 82 at p. 413 (2d ed. 1957).
68. PATTERSON § 82 at p. 410 (2d ed. 1957).
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Mayflower Ins. Exchange v. Gilmont, 280 F.2d 13 (9th
Cir. 1960) (applying Oregon law); Adriaensens v. Allstate Ins. Co., 258 F.2d
888 (10th Cir. 1958) (applying Oklahoma law); John Hancock Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Conway, 240 S.W.2d 644 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951); Ivory v. Reserve
Life Ins. Co., 78 S.D. 296, 101 N.W.2d 517 (1960); and other cases listed in
VANCE § 62 in n.1 (3d ed. 1951). For examples of the individual insurer
standard in statutory form see, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT ANN. § 20-1109(3)
(1956); N.Y. INS. LAW § 149(2) (1939); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3911.06
(Baldwin 1964). As to whether the prudent insurer standard is really more
objective see PATTERSON § 82 at 419 (2d ed. 1957).
71. See, e.g., Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mechanics' Savings Bank &
Trust Co., 72 F. 413, 428 (6th Cir. 1896) (applying Pennsylvania law);
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 262 Ky. 267, 273, 90 S.W.2d 44, 48
(1935); King v. Ohio Valley Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 212 Ky. 770, 775, 280
S.W. 127, 129 (1926).
72. 212 Ky. 770, 280 S.W. 127 (1926).
73. King v. Ohio Valley Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 212 Ky. 770, 775,
280 S.W. 127, 129 (1926).
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The judicial distrust of an insurer's testimony of its individual
practice seems to be the basis for the prudent insurer inquiry as
illustrated by the King case. As a result of the relatively unequal
bargaining positions of the insured and the insurer, the courts have
gradually developed a paternalistic desire to protect the insured.
But it is submitted that while a distrusting attitude may have once
been justified in dealing with insurance companies, years of legis-
lation and case law have provided sufficient safeguards for the in-
sured's interest. This is illustrated by the changing judicial
attitude of the courts with regard to the admissibility of opinion
testimony on materiality by an employee of the insurer. The older
rule excluded expert opinion testimony altogether or limited it to
qualified expert opinion evidence of the practice of insurance com-
panies generally. 74 This rule was rigidly enforced under the pru-
dent insurer standard. Presently, jurisdictions adhering to this
standard are increasingly recognizing that the testimony as to
whether a specific insurer would have refused the policy or charged
a higher premium is competent, although not conclusive, on the
ultimate issue of materiality.75 The interest of an employee would
have bearing on the credibility but not admissibility of his testi-
mony. Once it is realized that the practice of the individual in-
surer is the real issue and evidence thereon is admissible, there
seems little logic to support retention of the prudent insurer test.
Further objection to a criteria for materiality measured by the
practice of prudent insurers is that it unjustifiably compels the
insurer to be bound by general insurance practices. The insurer
in effect cannot reject an application or charge a higher premium
within this standard unless likewise is done by insurance companies
generally. While insurance contracts have taken a public nature
and are rigidly controlled by the courts, they have not yet been de-
clared charitable devices. As has been stated, the insurer and in-
sured are contractually related and whom to insure and at what
74. See the very thorough discussion thereon in Penn Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Mechanics' Savings Bank & Trust Co., 72 F. 413, 423-30 (6th Cir.
1896) (applying Pennsylvania law).
75. See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 74 F.2d 367 (5th
Cir. 1934) (applying Texas law); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Becraft, 213
Ind. 378, 12 N.E.2d 952 (1938); Annot., 115 A.L.R. 93 (1938); PATTERSON § 82
(2d ed. 1951); 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1920 (3d ed. 1940). Under the in-
dividual insurer standard this type evidence is more readily competent.
While there are no recent cases on point, such testimony appears to be
readily admissible. See, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stinger, 400 Pa. 533, 540, 163
A.2d 74, 78 (1960) (recognizing that insurer's underwriting manager might
testify that had a certain fact been known his company would not issue
him insurance).
price should be properly left to the parties, within reasonable
limits. 7 It is submitted that the prudent insurer standard un-
necessarily restricts the insurer's freedom to contract.
It should be likewise noted that the prudent insurer standard
presupposes that a uniform standard of materiality exists in the
insurance industry-a presumption that is not in fact always so. 77
Therefore, while ideally the prudent insurer standard seeks to
establish a more stable criteria of materiality, in practice it often
deteriorates into a battle of expert witnesses, a dispute for the jury
to resolve.78 Considering the distinct tendency of juries to deliver
verdicts favoring the insured, the potential danger of presupposing
standard criteria of materiality becomes apparent. The prudent
insurer standard therefore seems less acceptable than the individual
insurer criteria.
"MIGHT" CRITERIA OF MATERIALITY
The individual insurer test utilized by Pennsylvania and the
prudent insurer test are concerned with what the prudent or in-
dividual insurer would have done had the truth been known. A
few courts state that the test is "not that the insurer was influ-
enced, but that the fact, if truthfully stated might reasonably have
influenced the insurer in deciding whether it should reject or accept
the risk."7 9 While framing the materiality criteria with the word
"might" potentially creates less of a burden of proof on the in-
surer, the cases so doing involve situations where it is clear the in-
surer would have not acted differently had the truth been known.8 0
76. By "reasonable" here is meant within legal limits, rather that
reasonable as defined by the practice of insurers generally.
77. PATTERSON § 82 at 414 (2d ed. 1957). While many representations
are almost uniformly considered material by insurers, such as those con-
cerning prior serious illnesses in health or life insurance, other borderline
representations may not be. Examples of the latter might be, the price
paid for a car in applying for automobile insurance, statements of prior
losses in applying for burglary insurance, and inaccurate valuation of prop-
erty or description thereof in applying for fire insurance. The more cau-
tious the insurer the less the degree of variance between the truth and the
misrepresentation which might be needed to be established to warrant a
finding of materiality.
78. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 262 Ky. 267, 90 S.W.2d
44 (1935) (wherein both sides introduced expert opinions conflicting on the
issue as to whether a prudent insurer would issue a non-cancellable income
policy if the existence of a sanitarium report listing certain ailments of
the insured, had been known of).
79. Haas v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., 4 Wis. 2d 198, 203, 90 N.W.2d 146,
149 (1958) (emphasis added).
80. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Moldenhauer, 193 F.2d 663 (7th Cir.
1952) (applying law of Wisconsin) (misrepresentations as to price automo-
bile insurance cancellations held material); Stockinger v. Central National
Ins. Co., 24 Wisc. 2d 245, 128 N.W.2d 433 (1964) (misrepresentations as to
under twenty-five year old drivers held material); Haas v. Integrity
Mut. Ins. Co., 4 Wisc. 2d. 198, 90 N.W.2d 146 (1958) (misrepresentations
as to prior accidents, drivers license suspensions, insurance revocations
and traffic violations held material).
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Rescission voids a contract from the beginning.1 The supposedly
insured party or the beneficiary thereof is unexpectantly left to
resume the risk or liability usually after such has attached. Such
serious consequences should not and in practice does not result from
the inconclusive proof that the insurer "might" have been misled by
the misrepresentation. In an area presently beclouded in a maize
of conflicting terminology and application thereof, there exists no
logical sanction for the utilization of materiality in terms of "might"
language.
INCREASE THE RISK OF Loss CRITERIA
Mention has been made of early Pennsylvania cases stating
that a representation must be "material to the risk" to support a
claim for rescission.8 2 It was concluded that the language involved
the technical risk as assured by the insurer and therefore was a
logical extension of the basic materiality considerations. A similar
result is reached in interpreting the language "increased the risk,"
which is often found in the statutes of a few states.83
The language is misleading since the risk involved is not the
physical risk, but rather the technical risk as calculated by the
insurer. To illustrate, in Hughes Bros. v. Aetna Ins. Co.,84 the
insured in applying for fire insurance made a promissory warranty
that specified records of merchandise would be kept in an iron safe.
There was no substantial compliance with this term. The Supreme
Court of Tennessee in reversing a lower court decision held that
the misstatements increased the risk of loss within the purview of
a statute 5 requiring such for materiality since
the thing misrepresented need not necessarily be one that
increases the hazard in the sense that it actually occasions
or contributes to the loss. If. . . the matter misrepresented
"increases the risk" involved in the issuance of the policy
. . . then it may avoid the contract . . . [a] misrepresen-
81. See note 15 supra.
82. See pp. 257-61 supra.
83. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 28, § 6 (1958) (general application); MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 186 (1958) (general application); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 60.85 (1946) (general application); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-02-25
(1960) (general application); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-1103 (1955) (general
application). There are, however, cases holding that "increase the risk of
loss" unlike "material to the risk" requires a showing of increased prob-
ability of the physical hazard from attaching. See, O'Keefe v. Zurich
General Accident & Liability Co., 43 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1930) (applying
law of North Dakota).
84. 148 Tenn. 293, 255 S.W. 363 (1923).
85. Acts of 1895, ch. 160 § 22 SHAN., § 3306 (presently TENN. CODE
ANN. § 56-1103 (1955) (general application)).
tation about any matter of sufficient importance . . . to
naturally and reasonably influence the judgment of the in-
surer in making the contract, is a misrepresentation that
"increases the risk of loss" within the sense of the stat-
ute.86
The literal interpretation of the statute therefore succumbs to an
inherent recognition that the essential indicia of materiality is
whether the insurer has been unreasonably misled. One noted
treatise writer in considering the evidentiary aspects of the situ-
ation where materiality is determined by whether the misrepresen-
tation "increased the risk" stated:
The inquiry before the court in such a case is, in truth,
is the circumstance in question one which would have in-
fluenced the insurer . . . to fix a higher rate of premium?
In other words, not the objective reality of an increase
of danger is involved, but the relation which the circum-
stances in question subjectively bears to the insurer's set-
tled classified terms of charge. [T]he word "risk" does
not mean "actual danger" but "danger as determined by
the insurer's classification of the various circumstances
affecting the rate of premium"...
Our main inquiry, then is as to the insurer's schedule
of classified "risks" . . .we are in no way concerned with
the question of an actual increase in danger."7
From the foregoing it is apparent that any test of materiality re-
quiring an "increase of risk" or "increase of risk of loss" does not
alter the inquiry utilized in Pennsylvania today. It is submitted,
however, that the Pennsylvania language "material to risk" leaves
less room for confusion and is to be preferred.
"CONTRIBUTED TO RisK ATTACHING" STANDARD OF MATERIALITY
This last test requires that the fact misrepresented actually
contribute to the risk attaching to be deemed material enough to
warrant rescission.8 This is a distinct departure from tests dis-
cussed above. Materiality under this standard is determinable only
after the risk has attached. The insurer's detrimental inducement
caused by the false representation at the time of contracting is
86. Hughes Bros. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 148 Tenn. 293, 301, 255 S.W. 363,
365-366 (1923). (The court considered "iron safe" clauses as being neces-
sary for insurer to ascertain the extent of loss after a fire and the requiring
thereof was therefore reasonable).
87. 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1946 (3d ed. 1940).
88. One statute requiring such is in the following form:
No misrepresentation made in obtaining or securing a policy of
insurance on the life or lives of any person . . . shall be deemed
material, or render the policy void, unless the matter misrepre-
sented shall have actually contributed to the contingency or event
on which the policy is to become due and payable, and whether it
so contributed in any case shall be a question for the jury.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.580 (1949) (life, health and accident insurance). For
the "contributing to loss" standard as an alternative criteria see, TEx. INS.




irrelevant. Therefore, where an insured misrepresents that he has
not had a certain disease and subsequently dies from some cause
unrelated to the misrepresented disease, the insurer cannot re-
scind.89 It has been further noted that under such a standard false
statements as to medical consultations in applying for life insur-
ance could never be grounds for rescission since consultation itself
could not contribute to one's death.90 Such results render the
standard unsatisfactory, especially when it is remembered that the
true purpose of the materiality inquiry is to relieve an insurer
who has been substantially misled or stated otherwise to protect
the insured where the insurer has not been misled.
Under the Pennsylvania materiality criteria it is irrelevant
that the misrepresented fact had no bearing on or causal connection
with the attachment of the risk.9 If an applicant misrepresents
that he has had no prior serious diseases, it is not relevant to the
materiality thereof that the disease in no way contributed to the
death of the insured. The standard looking to the adverse effect
on the conscious evaluation of the risk at the time of contracting,
is in keeping with the historically sound contractual basis of the
materiality inquiry. While courts motivated by charitable instincts
may wish to create new criteria for rescission of insurance con-
tracts, as evinced by the trend toward requiring fraud, it is sub-
mitted that nothing is gained by confusing such with historic con-
cepts of materiality. When a court requires that a fact "contribute
to the risk attaching" before rescission based thereon be justified,
in effect "materiality" as properly connotated is not required at all.
It is submitted that the replacement of the materiality inquiry for
a causative one is neither practical in application nor logical in re-
sult.
Of the varying tests of materiality discussed, it is submitted
that the Pennsylvania individual insurer standard adopted by a
minority of states is historically and logically the most efficacious.
The Pennsylvania individual insurer standard avoids the unrealistic
89. See, Bohannon v. Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n, 223 Mo. App. 877,
20 S.W.2d 950 (1929) (wherein bad health of insured at time of receipt of
policy held not to bar recovery unless contributed to death, regardless
condition requiring policy not to be effective unless insured in good health
at time of receipt); Stone v. Security Life Ins. Co., 205 Mo. App. 597, 226
S.W. 619 (1920) (cancer of uterus which was the cause of death unknown to
applicant at time of application).
90. PATERESON § 83 at 429 (2d ed. 1957) (citing Keller v. Home Life
Ins. Co., 198 Mo. 440, 95 S.W. 903 (1906)).
91. Carson v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 1 Pa. Super. 572 (1896); Hartman
v. Keystone Ins. Co., 21 Pa. 477 (1853).
and non-relevant objectivity of the prudent insurer standard.
The Pennsylvania standard is framed in terms of what the insurer
would have done had the true fact been known. By requiring
either an increase in premium or rejection of risk as the necessary
indicia of substantial detrimental influence, the proper historic and
logical objectives of the materiality inquiry are fully realized.
MATERIALITY AS A MATTER OF LAW OR FACT IN PENNSYLVANIA
Ordinarily the question of materiality in Pennsylvania is one of
fact for the jury where a reasonable dispute of facts exists.92
Where, however, materiality is undisputed " or the fact misrepre-
sented is palpably or manifestly material, it becomes a question of
law for the courts.9 4 A majority of states are in accord. 5 This
inconsistency exists as a result of judicial recognition of the
marked proclivity of juries to find the facts warranting a verdict
for the insured. To leave the issue of materiality to jury deter-
mination in every case would unjustifiably invite the jury to find
immateriality when the uncontradicted evidence is contrary.9 6 To
protect the insurer and maintain some semblance of logical justice,
materiality will be concluded as a matter of law thus preempting
any adverse finding by the jury.
In Pennsylvania, misrepresentation's regarding inter alia prior
medical consultations,9 7 prior diseases and illnesses, 98 the existence
92. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stinger, 400 Pa. 533, 163 A.2d 74 (1960); Kop-
pleman v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 302 Pa. 106, 153 A. 121 (1930).
93. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. West, 149 F. Supp. 289
(D. Md. 1957) (where evidence on materiality is uncontradicted or clear
and convincing); Koppleman v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 302 Pa. 106,
153 A. 121 (1930); Murphy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 205 Pa. 444, 55 A. 19
(1903); March v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 186 Pa. 629, 40 A. 1100 (1898).
94. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stinger, 400 Pa. 533, 163 A.2d 74 (1960); Kop-
pleman v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 302 Pa. 106, 153 A. 121 (1930);
Lutz v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 186 Pa. 527, 40 A. 1104 (1898) ("intrin-
sically and essentially material to the risk"); Hermany v. Fidelity Mut.
Life Ins. Ass'n, 151 Pa. 17, 24 A. 1064 (1892). For the same rule as applied
to the requirement of fraud see, Orr. v. Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 202 Pa. Super.
553, 198 A.2d 431 (1964).
95. See, e.g., Carrolton Furniture Mfg. Co. v. American Credit In-
demnity Co., 124 F. 25 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 192 U.S. 505 (1904);
Knell v. Chickasaw Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 127 Iowa 748, 104 N.W.
364 (1905); United States Casualty Co. v. Campbel, 148 Ky. 554, 146
S.W. 1121 (1921); Orient Ins. Co. v. Van Zant-Bruce Drug Co., 50 Okla.
558, 151 P. 323 (1915).
96. See the instructions to the jury in March v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 186 Pa. 629, 40 A. 1100 (1898). In Lutz v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
186 Pa. 527, 40 A. 1104 (1898) the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed
a jury verdict for an insured and directed same for the insurer where the
answers as to prior diseases and medical consultations were undisputably
false. It was noted that the jury had completely disregarded materiality
in reaching their verdict.
97. Lutz v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 186 Pa. 527, 40 A. 1104 (1898);
March v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 186 Pa. 629, 40 A. 1100 (1898).
98. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stinger, 400 Pa. 533, 163 A.2d 74 (1960) (mental
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of incumbrances on property,9 9 age, 100  occupation,10 1 marital
status 0 2 and the presence of other insurance or prior insurance
rejections 03 have been held material as a matter of law. For
reasons already noted the judicial determination of materiality in
certain circumstances is desirable. But it is submitted that to treat
certain representations as always material as a matter of law is
inconsistent with the Pennsylvania individual insurer criteria of
materiality. Since the crucial factor to be considered in deter-
mining materiality is the extent of any damaging inducement on
the insurer as a result of the false representation, materiality by
necessity becomes an ad hoc consideration. What may be material
to insurer A may not be to insurer B, or even insurer A under
different circumstances. 04 The classifying of certain facts as ma-
terial as a matter of law and the increasing frequency of Penn-
sylvania courts to use such to determine materiality in subsequent
cases 0 5 serves only to constrict the materiality inquiry by an un-
realistic objective standard. In this sense the same weaknesses
previously discussed under the prudent insurer objective standard
make such judicial action under the individual insurer type stand-
ard also illogical. The constrictive nature of the objective aura of
legal presumption has gone far to deprive the materiality inquiry
illness); Murphy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 205 Pa. 444, 55 A. 19 (1903) (spitting
of blood and consumr tion).
99. Smith v. Columbia Ins. Co., 17 Pa. (5 Harris.) 253 (1851) (existence
of mortgage in fire insurance). It should be noted that such a fact might
not be material in other types of insurance-life insurance, for example.
Therefore, the type of insurance involved is always important.
100. Koppleman v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 302 Pa. 106, 153 A.
121 (1930); March v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 186 Pa. 629, 40 A. 1100
(1898) (dictum).
101. March v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 186 Pa. 629, 40 A. 1100 (1898)
(dictum).
102. Id.
103. See cases in note 99 supra.
104. For example, a misrepresentation that one is twenty-five years old
when really twenty-four, in applying for life insurance, may be material to
insurer A who regularly charges a higher premium for persons twenty-
five years old, or who does not accept applicants over twenty-four. It
may not, however, be material to insurer B who readily and regularly
accepts both twenty-four and twenty-five year old applicants at the same
premium. Likewise, the misrepresentation as to age may be material to
insurer A in the life insurance situation but immaterial where fire insurance
is involved.
105. See, e.g., Magee v. National Life and Accident Ins. Co., 201 Pa.
Super. 140, 192 A.2d 752 (1963) (stating that false answers as to prior med-
ical or surgical attention have been previously held material); Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Stinger, 400 Pa. 533, 163 A.2d 74 (1960) (stating that inquiries as
to prior diseases and medical attendance are material to the risk relying
solely on prior case law); Glaser v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 139 Pa.
Super. 261, 11 A.2d 558 (1940) (stating that under prior decisions a misrep-
resentation as to prior health was always material).
of its subjective utility. It is submitted that while it may be proper
to draw upon prior holdings of materiality to reinforce a present
position, the eternally varying factual situations in insurance liti-
gation dictate that such be done stringently. The materiality in-
quiry serves its historic and valuable objective only when applied
subjectively on an ad hoc basis.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Preliminarily it must be realized that an all-encompassing,
absolute standard of materiality is neither possible nor desirable.
The endlessly variable factual situations and policy determinations
involved in insurance litigation founded on misrepresentations de-
mand a flexible criteria framed in relatively broad terms. Such is
not to say that no guidelines for determining materiality be estab-
lished, as generally is the situation in Pennsylvania today.
The subjective nature and utility of the materiality inquiry
must be realized. The Pennsylvania courts have verbally adopted
an individual-insurer type standard consistent with the truly sub-
jective nature of the materiality inquiry. Yet, the judicial reliance
on prior holdings of materiality to find facts material as a matter of
law replaces the subjective factual determination with a cursory
judicial classification. It is submitted that such devitalization of
the materiality inquiry has largely been responsible for the sudden
emphasis on other criteria, such as the requirement of fraud.
The final classification properly lies with the legislature. The
important socio-economic rights involved in insurance litigation
makes clarity through legislative definition imperative. Such legis-
lation should be modeled after the New York Insurance Law.10 6
More specifically such legislation should provide inter alia that:
(1) A represented fact is grounds for rescinding an insurance policy
if it was false and material. A representation as to opinion, belief
or expectation is grounds for rescission of a policy of insurance only
if false, material and fraudulent. To be fraudulent within the mean-
ing of this section there must have been an intent to deceive.
(2) A fact is material if the knowledge thereof would have in-
fluenced the insurer not to issue the policy to the insured. Where
the knowledge of the fact would have influenced the insurer to
increase the premium, then the insurer is entitled to set-off from
the amount due to the insured under the policy, the difference
in premiums actually paid and those properly payable.
0 7
106. N.Y. INs. LAW §§ 142, 149 (McKinney 1939).
107. While there is little authority for refusing to grant rescission
where it has been established that only a higher premium would have
been charged, the continuing abhorrence of forfeitures of insurance con-
tracts seems to move logically in this direction. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 40, §§ 510 (life insurance), 753(B) (2) (general provision) (1954), where
it is provided that misstatements as to age shall not be grounds for re-
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(3) Evidence of the insurer's practice involving similar risks
is admissible to establish whether the risk would have been refused
had the truth been known. Evidence of the practices of the in-
surance industry generally is inadmissible since irrelevant to the
subjective determination of materiality.
CONCLUSION
Whenever a statement made by an applicant for insurance is
the basis for a subsequent action of rescission, Pennsylvania law
requires that such be false, of a material fact and fraudulently
made. A misstatement is of a material fact if the true fact, if
known to the insurer is of such import as would have caused the
insurer to either raise the premium or refuse the risk altogether.
An increasingly prevalent view of the remedy of rescission of insur-
ance contracts as being founded in deceit and thereby requiring
fraud, has done much to deemphasize the traditional notion of
materiality as the key inquiry to determine the propriety of grant-
ing rescission where a misstatement is involved. It is submitted
that if materiality has become insufficient as the controlling in-
quiry to determine justice in insurance litigation involving mis-
statements, such is the result of misconceived and ill-applied prin-
ciples thereof. While changing social attitudes constantly reshape
the law, no fair sense of justice warrants more than the traditional
requirements of falsity and materiality. If public policy dictates de-
creasing the frequency of forfeiture of insurance contracts then
such an objective is properly attainable by adopting a more strict
criteria of materiality as noted in my third recommendation. It is
submitted that a return to the traditional concept and utility of
the materiality inquiry with the exception noted in this Comment,
will return logical consistency to an area presently beclouded in
a maize of inconclusive judicial decisions.
CHARLES F. WILSON
scission but merely a corresponding reduction in insurer's financial liability.
It is submitted that the increased burden of proof on the insurer while not
historically supported provides maximum protection to the insured in an
era when courts strive for such. Likewise the insurer cannot claim that
it has been unfairly treated since by admitting only that higher premiums
would have been charged is to admit thereby that the risk was insurable
and would have been accepted except at higher premiums. When the
higher premiums payment is paid to insurer the injustice is rectified.
